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Abstract 
Imperial Germany is a prominent historical case in the study of Western Europe’s political 
development. This paper investigates the number and content of political conflict dimensions 
from the foundation of the modern German state in 1866 to the end of Bismarck’s reign as 
Chancellor in 1890. Methodologically, it applies dimension-reducing statistical methods to a 
novel dataset of content-coded parliamentary roll call votes. The analysis suggests that the 
emergence of the Catholic Centre Party in 1871 permanently transformed the conflict space 
from a single liberal-conservative divide to a two-dimensional space that distinguished 
positions on socio-economic issues and regime matters, respectively. The fact that positions 
on redistributive and regime issues were not aligned implies that theories stressing economic 
inequality as a driver for regime change are of limited applicability. Instead, the case of 
Imperial Germany highlights the importance of cross-cutting non-economic societal 
cleavages and the role of societal and political organisations in drawing attention to and 
perpetuating these divisions.     
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Political conflict dimensions in Bismarck’s Germany 
Germany’s political development before World War I forms the backdrop for a number of 
influential theories of democratization (Moore 1966), party development (Michels 1911), as 
well as party system creation and change (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Representing the 
paradigmatic case of the ‘late democratizer’ in Western Europe, even contemporary scholars 
of democratization feel compelled to demonstrate that their theories can provide an 
explanation for the longevity of the Kaiser’s regime (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006: 67, 
200–201; Ansell and Samuels 2014: 28–29, 52–54). This study contributes to our knowledge 
about German political development by identifying the dimensionality and content of the 
political conflict space during the founding years of the modern German state. It does so by 
analysing a novel data set of roll call votes taken in the Reichstag of the North German 
Confederation (1867-1871) and during the first seven legislative terms of the Reichstag of the 
German Empire (1871-1890). The study period covers Bismarck’s entire term as Chancellor, 
which is often seen as a distinct era in the history of Imperial Germany (e.g., Biefang 2012: 
17–18). The study complements the early dimensional analysis by Smith and Turner (1981) 
of parliamentary voting in Wilhelmine Germany as well as more recent studies by Debus and 
Hansen (2010; Hansen and Debus 2012) on parliamentary voting in the Weimar Republic. 
However, the study does not only increase our descriptive knowledge about the nature 
of political competition in an important historical case, it also contributes to the 
methodological debate about the interpretation of roll call analyses and the theoretical 
discussion about the causes of regime stability and change. Methodologically, the analysis 
illustrates the importance of taking the policy agenda into account when interpreting the 
results of a statistical scaling analysis. Apparent changes in the number of dimensions can be 
due to the genuine appearance or disappearance of particular conflict constellations as a result 
of the entrance or exit of actors or issues, or artificially induced by the legislative agenda 
restraining votes to policy issues related to only a subset of the dimensions. In practice, only 
substantive knowledge about the content of votes and the historical context of the case can 
help distinguish between these two scenarios. This is a particularly important issue when 
analysing parliamentary voting in historical cases with comparatively low levels of legislative 
productivity and a small number of associated roll call votes. In such circumstances, the 
results of scaling analyses are particularly sensitive to agenda effects.  
Theoretically, the study results inform the debate on economic inequality as a cause of 
democratization (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 2003). 
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A shared assumption of these political economy approaches to democratisation is that regime 
preferences are induced by economic interests. If that was the case, political conflict 
dimensions should be aligned with and reducible to divergent socio-economic cleavages. 
However, the findings of the scaling analysis show that such an alignment did not generally 
exist in 19th century Germany. For most of the time period studied, positions of party groups 
varied along two separate dimensions, one relating to socio-economic issues and one to 
regime matters. This separation was mainly due to the emergence of the Centre Party in 1871, 
which can ultimately be traced back to a religious cleavage between the Catholic minority 
and the Protestant majority in Germany. Given the significant influence of this non-economic 
factor in structuring political competition, theories based on economic inequality as primary 
causal variable for democratization cannot provide convincing explanations for the longevity 
of this authoritarian regime.1 
The political system of Imperial Germany 
The North German Confederation was established under Prussian leadership in 1867, after 
Prussia had defeated Austria in the ‘German War’ of 1866. A few years later, another 
victorious war of Prussia, this time against France, paved the way for the accession of the 
South German states to the Confederation and for the foundation of the German Empire. The 
constitution of the German Empire of 1871 was largely inherited from the North German 
Confederation. One of the constitution’s most progressive features was the provision of equal 
suffrage for all male citizens of 25 years’ age or older. However, as an intentional 
‘corrective’, the constitution banned the payment of allowances to deputies in an effort to 
restrict the passive suffrage (Butzer 1999: 29). It also established a strict separation-of-power 
system, consciously designed to prevent a parliamentarization of the regime (Rauh 1973: 48). 
The Kaiser remained in full control of the military, and the Reichstag’s yearly budget 
approval right did not extend to the military budget. The Reichstag shared legislative powers 
with the Bundesrat, which represented the governments of the kingdoms and principalities in 
this federal monarchy. Contrary to a common misperception, the Reichstag was able to 
initiate legislation (Anderson 2000: 10); and in practice, the approval of bills involved 
reaching compromises between the Reichstag and the Bundesrat, similar to bicameral 
bargaining in current-day legislatures.2  
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By occupying several important posts between 1867 and 1890, Bismarck held a 
particularly elevated position in this system. As Chancellor, Bismarck chaired the Bundesrat 
and was the only politically responsible member of the imperial government (Reichsleitung). 
Government departments were not led by ministers but state secretaries, who were 
subordinate to the Chancellor. At the same time, Bismarck was the prime minister and 
foreign secretary of Prussia. In this latter function, he commanded Prussia’s votes in the 
Bundesrat. Prussia’s votes were sufficient to veto any constitutional change and, together 
with the votes of various micro-state enclaves that were completely dependent on Prussia 
(Rauh 1973: 60–61), could determine legislative decisions in this body. Although Bismarck 
enjoyed strong public support, his power and influence was ultimately dependent on the trust 
and backing by the Kaiser and King of Prussia, who could unilaterally appoint and dismiss 
the Chancellor or members of the Prussian government. 
At the national level, the parties that competed for seats in the Reichstag can be divided 
into four broad camps. The liberal camp consisted of the left-leaning German Progress Party 
(Deutsche Fortschrittspartei), renamed to German Liberal Party (Deutsch-Freisinnige Partei) 
in 1884, and the right-leaning National Liberal Party (Nationalliberale Partei). In contrast to 
the Left Liberals, the National Liberals were willing to compromise their political liberal 
principles as long as progress was made on establishing a liberal economic order in a unified 
nation state. During the first ten years of Bismarck’s reign as Chancellor, the National 
Liberals were his primary partner in the Reichstag. The conservative camp consisted of the 
Free Conservative Party (Freikonservative Partei) and the German Conservative Party 
(Deutsch-Konservative Partei).3 The Free Conservatives, mostly high aristocracy and senior 
bureaucrats, were ardent supporters of Bismarck’s policies throughout his term of office 
(Stalmann 2000). The German Conservatives, which included more members of the landed 
Prussian aristocracy, the infamous Junkers, were more critical of Bismarck’s early policies 
regarding national unification and the implementation of largely liberal economic ideas. The 
Catholic camp consisted of the Centre Party (Zentrum), often supported by representatives of 
regional and national minority groups (i.e. Poles, French, and Guelphs). Some of its leaders 
had already been members of the diverse Particularist party group in the Reichstag of the 
North German Confederation, but the Centre Party was only formed in 1870. It entered the 
Reichstag after the foundation of the German Empire in 1871. Finally, the Socialists 
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constitute the last camp. Before their merger in 1875 under the label of Socialist Worker’s 
Party (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei), this camp was composed of two small factions, which 
sometimes fiercely opposed each other, the General German Workers’ Association 
(Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein) and the Social Democratic Worker’s Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei). 
Figure 1 shows the share of Reichstag seats of these party groups over time. Party 
groups are roughly ordered along their position on a general liberal-conservative dimension. 
Conservative party groups are at the top of the figure, and liberal ones at the bottom. Cells are 
shaded according to the share of seats a party group held during a legislative term. Although 
the table indicates considerable fractionalization, it also shows that five groups dominated the 
Reichstag for most of the period: the two conservative and the two liberal parties, and since 
1871, the Centre Party. The table also shows that the Socialists were a fringe group that 
played no decisive role in the Reichstag during that period of time.4  
At this point, it should be noted that the fragmented multiparty nature of legislative 
competition in Germany’s national parliament differed from electoral competition at the 
district level. Partly due to Germany’s electoral system with run-off elections in single-
member districts, party political competition at the local level was often limited to two or 
three parties; and the identity of these parties often depended on local socio-economic, ethnic, 
or religious cleavages. In the most extreme cases, party competition was not only more 
limited but almost completely absent, with the election of the candidate of a particular party 
being virtually a certainty. The Centre Party was particularly successful in that respect, but a 
sizeable number of Polish and German Conservative seats were similarly secure (Schauff 
1973: 307). Thus, the analysis presented here describes party political competition at the 
national level, resulting from the electoral aggregation of quite disparate political conflict 
constellations in electoral districts at the local level. 
Figure 1 allows us to make some inferences about the potential influence of different 
groups and possible majority constellations at the national level in the Reichstag. First, the 
government could never rely on an exclusively conservative majority. The two conservative 
party groups reached their highest combined seat share of 34.6% in the Reichstag of the 
North German Confederation of 1867. Second, the North German Confederation was 
essentially a bipolar system, separating the conservative from the liberal camp, but neither 
camp commanded a clear majority on its own. Third, the newly formed Centre Party entered 
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the first Reichstag of the German Empire immediately as the second largest party and from 
1874 continuously won about a quarter of the seats. Considering that the minority groups 
usually supported the Centre Party, the effective share of Reichstag votes commanded by this 
party group was probably closer to one-third. Fourth, the National Liberals were the 
dominant party group until 1878. They reached the peak of their parliamentary representation 
of 38% during the second Reichstag term, after the Prussian government had thrown its 
support behind National Liberal rather than German Conservative candidates during the 
election of 1874. 
 
Figure 1 Share of Reichstag seats of party groups by legislative term 
Notes: Minorities include French, Polish, and Guelphs. Besides the German Progress Party/German Liberal 
Party (Deutsche Fortschrittspartei/Deutsch-Freisinnige Partei), Left Liberals include the Free Association (Freie 
Vereinigung, 1867-1871), the German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, 1871-1890), and the Liberal 
Association (Liberale Vereinigung, 1881-1884). Before 1877, Socialists include the General German Workers’ 
Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein) and the Social Democratic Workers’ Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei). These two groups merged in 1875 to form the Socialist Workers’ Party 
(Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei). NDRT = Reichstag of the North German Confederation; RT = Reichstag of the 
German Empire. See Table A1 in the online appendix for a more detailed numerical breakdown. 
6 
 
However, in 1878, Bismarck dissolved the Reichstag prematurely, blaming the liberal party 
groups for the rejection of his first anti-socialist law bill. As a consequence, public support 
for liberals of all strands dropped. Furthermore, during the fourth term, the left wing of the 
National Liberals seceded from the party group over disagreements regarding the support of 
Bismarck’s protectionist and repressive policies. The fifth and sixth Reichstag had the most 
left-leaning and oppositional composition. The National Liberals only made significant gains 
again in the elections of 1887, after another premature dissolution of the Reichstag by the 
government. This time, Bismarck had blamed the Centre Party, the Left Liberals, and 
Socialists for rejecting his proposal for another seven-year military budget, claiming that 
increases in military spending were necessary to avert an allegedly imminent attack by 
France. Forming the so-called ‘Kartell’ electoral coalition with Free and German 
Conservatives, National Liberal election candidates enjoyed the support of a united right as 
well as the Prussian bureaucracy. However, even this government-friendly alliance broke 
apart in 1890 because of its members’ refusal to compromise over the renewed extension of 
the anti-socialist law. 
Based on the historical record, it is difficult to develop firm expectations about the 
dimensionality of the party system’s conflict space or the content of its dimensions, 
especially as both might also have changed over time. With respect to its dimensionality, 
contemporaries and historians referred to the Centre Party and the National Liberals often as 
the ‘middle parties’ (e.g., Nipperdey 2013: 513), implying that they occupied ground in-
between ideological poles. At the same time, they also suggest that Bismarck was able to 
govern with varying majorities (e.g., Pflanze 1982: 572), which indicates the existence of a 
multi-dimensional conflict space. In general, given the high fragmentation of the party system 
and the variety of underlying cleavages, it seems likely that the conflict space was 
multidimensional, but expectations about the exact number of dimensions and their content 
are hard to discern a priori. 
Collection and coding of Reichstag roll call votes 
To identify the number and the content of political conflict dimensions in Bismarck’s Reich, 
the study conducts a scaling analysis of roll call votes taken in the Reichstag between 1867 
and 1890. In the Reichstag, the standard way of voting was to stand up or remain seated. A 
proposal for a vote by roll call required the support of at least 50 deputies, which constituted 
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quite a large threshold.5 Before the introduction of voting by division through an amendment 
of the rules of procedure in 1874, votes that were too close to call also immediately triggered 
a roll call.6 In practice, these thresholds ensured that recorded votes were called on important 
and divisive topics that engaged a substantial number of legislators. Possible selection biases 
are a fundamental concern for studies of roll call voting (e.g. Carrubba et al. 2006). However, 
to the extent that the probability of calling a roll call vote is positively associated with 
political conflict, the selective nature of roll call votes actually results in a more informative 
sample for the purposes of identifying conflict lines in the legislature; and given the 
distribution of mandates across party groups, none of the three main camps (conservatives, 
liberals, Catholics) in the Reichstag were prevented from requesting a roll call vote during 
any of the legislative terms. 
The source for the voting information is the overview of roll call votes in Appendix A 
of the ‘General Register for the Stenographical Reports of all Reichstag Sessions from 1867 
to 1895’ (Reichstagsbureau 1896). After downloading the digitized version of the General 
Register from the website of the Bavarian State Library, optical character recognition (OCR) 
software was used to convert the PDF images of the roll call vote appendix into machine-
readable text. To identify the full population of legislators and disambiguate their party group 
affiliation and electoral district at the time of a vote, the vote data was linked to biographical 
information from the online database Biorab-Kaiserreich, which is hosted by the Centre for 
Historical Social Research at the GESIS Leibnitz Institute for the Social Sciences. Before 
combining the two datasets through a custom-made record linkage algorithm, information 
from both sources was extracted through computer scripts developed in Python. Several steps 
in the data collection process required extensive manual review and corrections based on the 
consultation of historical primary and secondary sources.7 
To assess possible agenda changes in the roll call data over time, the policy area of each 
roll call was coded from its brief description in the General Register. The description is 
sufficient to identify the general policy area of a proposal, but not for identifying the specific 
rationale behind amendments to articles or paragraphs within a proposal. To reliably code 
policy content at the level of individual amendments, detailed case knowledge about the 
context of hundreds of individual votes would have been required. Absent such knowledge, 
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the coding takes the stated policy goals of the proposal as a whole at face value. However, it 
needs to be acknowledged that this coding procedure is likely to understate somewhat the 
number of votes that had implications for civil rights and liberties, the relative power of the 
Reichstag vis-à-vis other institutions, or the relative power of the Reich vis-à-vis its 
component states. In terms of policy categories, the topic coding scheme of the Comparative 
Agendas Project was used.8 Despite being widely used in the study of comparative policy-
making, this seems to be the first time that the scheme is applied to a historical case.  
In general, the roll call votes in the dataset are mostly about the operation and 
organisation of the state (19 per cent), foreign trade regulation (16 per cent), military 
organisation and defence spending (13 per cent), law and crime (12 per cent), the regulation 
of domestic commerce (11 per cent), civil rights and liberties (10 per cent), macroeconomic 
policy (6 per cent), and social welfare (5 per cent). The fact that roll call votes are 
concentrated in 8 out of 20 possible policy categories shows how limited the agenda diversity 
of the Reichstag was compared to current-day legislatures. The Reichstag was in session only 
about 3 to 6 months a year; and the involvement of the state in social and economic matters 
only started to build up in the 1880s. Thus, both the capacity and demand for legislative 
productivity was comparatively low. 
Figure 2 shows that the policy area concentration of roll call votes is even more 
pronounced within individual legislative terms. This concentration of the agenda is not a 
methodological artefact but reflects a real focus of the Reichstag’s limited attention on a 
single or a small number of particularly important and comprehensive pieces of legislation. 
These prominent pieces of legislation often involved a large number of amendments decided 
through roll call votes. As long as there is a sizable share of roll call votes in policy areas 
relating to other conflict dimensions, a strong concentration of attention on a single policy 
area is not problematic for identifying the dimensionality of the conflict space or the content 
of conflict dimensions. For the purposes of this study, selection effects of the agenda are only 
consequential when they focus the attention of the Reichstag on policy areas that relate 
exclusively to a subset of the dimensions structuring the conflict space. For example, the 
analysis below shows that the scaling results for the second legislative term of the Reichstag 
suffer from the effects of a selective agenda; not because its agenda was focused on any 
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single policy area, but because its agenda was focused on a set of policy areas that all relate 
to a single dimension of a multidimensional conflict space. 
From a historical perspective, it is interesting that Figure 2 shows a clear pattern in 
attention to different policy areas over time. During the so-called ‘liberal era’ of the North 
German Confederation (NDRT) and the first three legislative terms of the Reichstag (RT 1 to 
RT 3), roll call votes focused to a large extent on measures aimed at clarifying the role and 
operation of government institutions, as well as the establishment of a functioning federal 
administration. Attention was also devoted to developing a penal code (Law, Crime, and 
Family Issues in NDRT and RT 2) and a harmonised court system (RT 2). In contrast, after 
what some historians have called the ‘second founding’ of the Reich in 1878 (Barkin 1987; 
Gerschenkron 1943), the focus switched from state-building measures to economic and social 
policies. In particular, trade tariffs (Foreign Trade in RT 4, 6, and 7), domestic taxes 
(Macroeconomic Issues in RT 4, 5, 6, 7), and a new system of social welfare insurance 
(Social Welfare in RT 4, 5, and 7) were high on the agenda. Finally, three policy areas were 
the subject of roll call votes throughout the period studied here: civil rights and liberties 
(especially repressive measures against the Catholic Church during the Culture War and 
against Social Democrats after the anti-socialist law was first introduced in 1878), the 
organisation and financing of the military, and the regulation of domestic commerce. The fact 
that much of the regulation of domestic commerce in the 1880s (RT 5 and 7) was about 
‘correcting’ the liberal policies adopted in the North German Confederation in the late 1860s 





Figure 2 Share of roll call votes in different policy areas by legislative term 
Notes: Policies were classified according to the classification scheme of the Comparative Agendas Project 
(http://www.comparativeagendas.info). NDRT = Reichstag of the North German Confederation; RT = Reichstag 
of the German Empire. See Table A2 in the online appendix for a full numerical breakdown. 
In total, the data consists of 129,579 potential vote choices. These vote choices relate to 322 
roll call votes in seven legislative terms by a total of 2884 members of the Reichstag. 
Because the third Reichstag was dissolved prematurely, only nine roll call votes were taken 
during that term. This low number of votes precludes a separate scaling analysis. Hence, this 
legislative term had to be omitted from the sample. Table 1 shows that, in most other terms, 
the number of roll call votes ranged between 30 and 50. Only the Reichstag of the North 
German Confederation (NDRT) stands out for its exceptionally large number of roll call 
votes (i.e., 81). The large number of roll calls in the NDRT is at least partly a result of the 
high legislative productivity of this parliament (Pollmann 1985: 433, 451). It is also 
noteworthy that the number of legislators per term is usually substantially higher than the 
number of constituent members at the time, indicating substantial turnover of members 
within a term. 
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Table 1 Roll call vote characteristics by legislative term 
 NDRT RT 1 RT 2 RT 4 RT 5 RT 6 RT 7 
Yeah or nay vote 15710 12286 12383 11343 13020 9454 8114 
 0.57 0.62 0.70 0.62 0.65 0.69 0.63 
Treated as missing 11668 7442 5299 6861 7002 4241 4756 
 0.43 0.38 0.30 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.37 
Of which:        
Abstained 20 37 49 30 52 118 352 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Absent 11578 7360 5238 6797 6924 4121 4400 
 0.42 0.37 0.30 0.37 0.35 0.30 0.34 
Not a member  70 45 12 34 26 2 4 
at time of vote 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 27378 19728 17682 18204 20022 13695 12870 
(Proportion) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Number of roll calls 81 48 42 41 47 33 30 
Number of legislators 338 411 421 444 426 415 429 
Average turnout 0.58 0.63 0.70 0.63 0.65 0.70 0.66 
(Standard deviation) 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.12 
Average vote margin 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.2 0.21 0.29 
(Standard deviation) 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.23 
Notes: NDRT=Reichstag of North German Confederation, RT=Reichstag of German Empire 
Table 1 also provides further information about the voting data that actually entered the 
scaling analysis. In total, the scaling analysis is based on 82,310 substantive individual vote 
choices (i.e. yeah or nay votes). As is standard in the literature, abstentions, absent members, 
or instances where a legislator was not a member (yet or anymore) at the time of the roll call 
are treated as missing values. In general, abstentions were extremely rare. They increased 
somewhat towards the end of the study period, but still constituted only 1 and 4 per cent of 
the substantive vote choices in the sixth and seventh legislative term of the Reichstag (RT), 
respectively. Absenteeism was generally rather high. Average turnout ranged between 58 per 
cent in the NDRT and 70 per cent in RT 2 and RT 6. Given the lack of parliamentary 
allowances and the long distances to be travelled by legislators, low attendance rates were a 
permanent problem in the Reichstag (Butzer 1999: 147). Although the number of roll calls in 
each term is relatively small compared to many contemporary legislatures, they are generally 
very informative. The average margin between yeah and nay votes ranged between 19 
percentage points in the NDRT and 29 percentage points in RT 7. Thus, almost all roll calls 
meet the minimum vote margin requirement for the scaling analysis.    
12 
 
The number and content of political conflict dimensions 
To estimate legislators’ policy positions from the observed vote choices, I employ Poole’s 
non-parametric Optimal Classification (OC) algorithm (Poole 2000; Poole 2005). Similar to 
parametric alternatives, like Nominate (Poole and Rosenthal 2007) or Bayesian Item 
Response Theory models (Clinton et al. 2004), OC assumes that the policy space is Euclidean 
and that legislators vote sincerely based on single-peaked and symmetric utility functions. In 
contrast to other methods, OC does not require specific assumptions about the functional 
form of legislators’ utility functions or their distribution of voting errors (Armstrong et al. 
2014: 249). In fact, when minimizing the total number of errors in its classification of vote 
choices, OC treats all voting errors equally. In situations where the error rate is low or the 
distribution of errors is unknown, OC has thus clear advantages (Armstrong et al. 2014: 265–
266).  
At least two characteristics of voting in the Reichstag make the application of OC 
preferable to parametric methods. Firstly, voting cohesion varies considerably across party 
groups. If some legislators are more likely to toe the party group line than others, the 
assumption that errors are identically and independently distributed is likely to be violated    
(Rosenthal and Voeten 2004). More importantly, as will be shown below, a two-dimensional 
spatial model fits the observed vote choices almost perfectly. When error rates are so low, 
parametric methods push ideal points to the edge of the policy space to maximize the log-
likelihood (Armstrong et al. 2014: 266; Rosenthal and Voeten 2004). As a result, distances 
between ideal points do not only reflect differences in policy positions, but also differences in 
the number of voting errors. This ‘sag’ problem exaggerates distances of legislators with 
extreme and interior policy positions (Armstrong et al. 2014: 269). One cost of a non-
parametric method like OC is that the ideal point scaling results do not come with estimates 
of the associated uncertainty, but its benefits in terms of more valid ideal point estimates 
outweigh this shortcoming.  
To investigate possible changes in the number and content of conflict dimensions over 
time, I apply the OC algorithm separately to each legislative term. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the input data and various model fit statistics. The analysis is limited to 
legislators who voted in at least 15 roll calls in a legislative term and excludes extremely lop-
sided votes where the minority consisted of less than 2.5 per cent of voters. Unfortunately, 
these restrictions are necessary to yield meaningful estimates. As the top part of Table 2 
shows, the consequences of the application of these criteria are more pronounced for 
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legislators than for roll calls. The roll call vote criterion results in a ‘loss’ of only a single 
vote in the sixth legislative term. Yet, a considerable number of legislators are dropped in 
each term because they have not taken part in the minimal number of roll call votes.9 
Dimensionality of the conflict space 
The first step of the analysis examines the dimensionality of the political space separately for 
each legislative term. Unfortunately, no single best method exists to determine the ‘correct’ 
number of conflict dimensions. To make sure the selection of dimensions is robust and 
provides substantively meaningful results, several statistical criteria were combined. First, as 
recommended by Poole (2005: 144), scree plots of the eigenvalues of the double-centred 
agreement score matrix were examined. Table 2 provides the number of eigenvalues after 
which the plot flattens out.10 None of the scree plots indicates a dimensionality larger than 
three. Thus, in a second step, one, two, and three-dimensional scaling solutions were 
generated with the OC algorithm. The fit statistics for these solutions in the lower part of 
Table 2 provide further information about the number of dimensions underlying legislative 
voting in the Reichstag. To judge the model fit of OC, we can look at the percentage of vote 
choices that were correctly classified (PCC) and the aggregate proportional reduction in error 
(APRE) across all roll calls. The latter measure has the advantage that it takes into account 
the distribution of vote margins (Poole 2005: 129). APRE provides an indication of the extent 
to which the OC solution reduces the classification error vis-à-vis a theory-free baseline 
model that assumes that all legislators vote with the majority.    
                                                 
9
 A replication using a threshold of 10 roll call votes does not yield meaningful results. The results regarding 
dimensionality and the relative location of party groups in the political space are similar when a threshold of 20 
or 25 roll call votes is used. 
10
 See Figure A1 in the online appendix for the actual plots. 
14 
 
Table 2 Fit of one- to three-dimensional Optimal Classification models by 
legislative term 
 
NDRT RT  1 RT  2 RT  4 RT  5 RT  6 RT  7 
Total no. of roll calls 81 48 42 41 47 33 30 
No. of scaled roll calls 81 48 42 41 47 32 30 
Total no. of legislators 338 411 421 444 426 415 429 
No. of scaled legislators 290 356 370 357 371 352 312 
No. of eigenvalues (scree plots) 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 
One dimension        
Percentage correctly classified 94.9 87.8 95.6 89.9 93.3 93.4 92.1 
Aggregate PRE 87.4 68.1 88.1 73.9 83.3 84 76.7 
Two dimensions        
Percentage correctly classified 96.6 93.5 97.6 96.7 98.7 98.5 99 
Aggregate PRE 91.7 83.1 93.6 91.6 96.8 96.4 96.9 
Difference correct classification 1.7 5.7 2 6.8 5.4 5.1 6.9 
Difference aggregate PRE 4.3 15 5.5 17.7 13.5 12.4 20.2 
No. roll calls PRE diff. > 0.20 4 16 3 8 11 6 11 
% roll calls PRE diff. > 0.20 4.9 33.3 7.1 19.5 23.4 18.2 36.7 
Three dimensions        
Percentage correctly classified 97.6 95.8 98.2 98.3 99.1 99 99.5 
Aggregate PRE 94.1 88.9 95 95.6 97.9 97.6 98.4 
Difference correct classification 1 2.3 0.6 1.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Difference aggregate PRE 2.4 5.8 1.4 4 1.1 1.2 1.5 
No. roll calls PRE diff. > 0.20 2 5 0 2 0 0 0 
% roll calls PRE diff. > 0.20 2.5 10.4 0 4.9 0 0 0 
Conclusion (no. of dimensions) 1+ 2+ 1+ 2+ 2 2 2 
Notes: NDRT=Reichstag of North German Confederation, RT=Reichstag of German Empire, PRE=Proportional 
Reduction in Error 
The first thing to notice about the model fit statistics is that the correct classification rates for 
all legislative terms are very high. For one-dimensional models, they range between 87.8 per 
cent in RT 1 and 95.6 in RT 2. Yet for most terms, adding a second dimension still improves 
the classification rate considerably. For the two-dimensional solutions, the rates vary from 
93.5 per cent in RT 1 to 99 per cent in RT 7. Classification rates as high as these leave little 
room for further model fit improvements as a result of the introduction of a third dimension. 
In fact, we can be quite certain that political conflict in the NDRT, RT 2, as well as RT 5 to 7 
can be represented in fewer than three dimensions. For these terms, the difference in the rate 
of correct classification between a three- and two-dimensional solution is one percentage 
point or lower, and the difference in APRE is less than 5 percentage points. Except for a 
couple of roll calls in the NDRT, none of the proportional reduction in error (PRE) values for 
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individual roll calls improves by more than 20 per cent when introducing a third dimension. 
The model fit improvements for RT 1 and 4 are somewhat larger but still rather marginal. 
Using a 5-percentage point increase in the rate of correct classification, a 10-percentage 
point increase in APRE, and a PRE increase of more than 20 per cent for at least 10 per cent 
of the roll calls as a combined threshold for judging the gain in predictive power of adding a 
second dimension, we can conclude that political conflict in RT 1 and RT 4 to 7 was at least 
two-dimensional. The NDRT and RT 2 show some gain in predictive power when estimating 
a second dimension as well, but compared to the other terms, it is rather negligible. In 
summary, the results suggest that political conflict in RT 5, 6, and 7 was almost certainly 
two-dimensional. Taking into account the number of dimensions indicated by the scree plots, 
the balance of evidence suggests that political conflict in RT 1 and 4 was also two-
dimensional, but political conflict in the NDRT and RT 2 was one-dimensional.     
Nature of conflict 
The content of conflict dimensions is determined by substantive knowledge rather than 
statistical methods. Such knowledge about the content of votes also helps to further interpret 
the dimensionality of the conflict space. Figure 3 plots the OC solutions for all legislative 
terms. Depending on the number of dimensions selected based on the statistical criteria 
outlined in the previous section, the panels show either the estimated legislator ideal points of 
the one- (NDRT and RT 2) or two-dimensional OC solution (all other terms).  The 
interpretation of the content of the political conflict space of some of the legislative terms is 
somewhat complicated by the fact that the mathematical dimensions do not align with the 
substantive dimensions (for a similar result in the case of the National Assembly of the 
French Fourth Republic, see Poole 2005: 152; Rosenthal and Voeten 2004). For ease of 
comparison and interpretation, the two-dimensional solutions were rotated to ensure that the 
centroid of the German Conservative legislators’ ideal points aligned with the diagonal in the 
top-right quadrant of the plot. Little doubt exists that the German Conservatives held 
conservative positions on both socio-economic and regime issues. To learn about the content 
of issue dimensions, we can examine by how much the PRE value for a roll call increases as 




Figure 3 Legislator ideal point estimates by legislative terms 
Notes: NDRT=Reichstag of North German Confederation, RT=Reichstag of German Empire, 1D=one-
dimensional solution, 2D=two-dimensional solution, rotated to fix centroid of German Conservatives to 
diagonal line in upper right quadrant. Z=Centre Party, K=German Conservatives, R=Free Conservatives, 
N=National Liberals, F=Left Liberals, S=Socialists, M=Minorities, W=Independents, B=Particularists (NDRT 




In the NDRT, the few roll calls whose PRE value increases substantively after allowing for 
the estimation of a second dimension are quite diverse and cover similar topics to those 
whose PRE values do not increase substantively. Thus, in isolation, the approach does not 
provide insights for the interpretation of the substance of the one-dimensional conflict space 
of this term. In the case of RT 1, comparing roll calls with a small increase in PRE values (< 
5 per cent) with roll calls with a large increase (> 20 per cent) indicates that the first 
dimension captures differences in views about civil rights and liberties as well as the powers 
of parliament, especially its control over the military budget, whereas the second dimension 
captures differences in views about the relation between the state and the church, the 
distribution of competences of regional states vice-a-vis the federal government, and the 
setting of tariffs. In short, the first dimension bundles ‘regime’ matters, while the second 
dimension covers ‘economic and social policy’. With respect to the latter, the term ‘social’ 
refers to ideas about the (federal) state’s role in society, rather than exclusively redistributive 
policies. 
As the panel for RT 1 in Figure 3 shows, the regime dimension pits left liberals (F), the 
Centre Party (Z), and various regional and ethnic minorities (M), who champion civil rights 
and liberties and demand increased parliamentary powers and control over the military, 
against the conservative camp (K, F), which defends the current regime. National Liberals 
(N) and members of the Liberal Empire Party (L, which existed as a party group only in 
RT 1) take somewhat intermediate positions. In contrast, the economic and social policy 
dimension differentiates the conservative parties, the Centre Party, and the minorities on the 
one side from the three liberal party groups on the other side. The former defend traditional 
economic structures, protectionist trade policies, existing social hierarchies, as well as the 
independence of the Reich’s component states, while the latter are proponents of deregulated 
markets, free trade, the abolishment of established feudal prerogatives, and a strong nation 
state.  
This pattern of positions is relatively consistent throughout all legislative terms with 
two-dimensional solutions presented in Figure 3 (i.e. RT 1 and RT 4 to 7). On one dimension, 
the positions of members of the conservative groups and the Centre Party are aligned with 
each other against the positions of members of the liberal and socialist groups; on the other 
dimension, the positions of members of the conservative groups and the National Liberals are 
aligned with each other against the positions of members of the Centre Party, Socialists, and 
Left Liberal groups. Of course, the locations of ideal points and the distances between them 
are not comparable across legislative terms, and, although reasonable, the rotation of the plots 
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is somewhat arbitrary. Yet, all two-dimensional solutions show the same broad constellation 
of party group members’ ideal points. Starting with the German Conservatives in the upper 
right quadrant and moving in clock-wise direction, the Free Conservatives are the closest, 
followed by the National Liberals, the Left Liberals, and Socialists. Finally, the minority 
groups and the Centre Party members complete the circle.  
In terms of face validity, the scaling results are in line with a number of stylized 
historical facts about coalition and voting patterns in the Bismarck era: The Free 
Conservatives formed a bridge between National Liberals and German Conservatives, the 
minority groups tended to align with the Centre Party, and the left wing of the National 
Liberals, which seceded in 1880 and formed the Liberal Association in RT 5, held 
intermediate positions between the left liberal Progressive Party and the remaining members 
of the National Liberal Party. Furthermore, Figure A2 in the online appendix shows that this 
division within the National Liberal Party is visible in earlier legislative terms as well. Left-
wing National Liberals, who would later secede from the party, tended to hold positions 
closer to those of left liberals than the bulk of their fellow group members. 
Even the apparently one-dimensional conflict space of RT 2 can be interpreted in that 
vein. In RT 2, the first dimension plotted in Figure 3 represents different views on regime 
matters, with the Centre Party, the minority groups, the Socialists, and the Left Liberals 
favouring democratic reforms, while the National Liberals, the Free Conservatives and the 
German Conservatives are protecting the status quo. The second, socio-economic policy 
dimension does not add much to the statistical model fit (and thus only the one-dimensional 
solution is shown in Figure 3). Still, some indications exist that the second dimension is 
based on the same type of divisions as in the clearly two-dimensional legislative terms. The 
few roll calls with a considerably improved PRE value relate to tariffs and the building of a 
new plenary building for the Reichstag (i.e. trade policy and powers of the federal state). 
However, most other roll calls in this term were about matters relating to the regulation of the 
press, the military, the organisation of Courts, and the proceedings in criminal trials. In other 
words, with matters relating to the regime dimension. Thus, the apparent reversal to a single 
dimension in RT 2 is an artefact of a legislative agenda dominated by regime matters rather 
than real changes in the underlying conflict space. Disagreements over socio-economic issues 
did not disappear in RT 2, they were just hardly visible in parliamentary activities.    
Unlike in RT 1 and 2, the statistically dominant dimension of conflict in RT 4 was the 
socio-economic dimension, and the regime dimension became secondary. This signifies 
another but less consequential agenda effect: the change in emphasis in law-making from 
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state-building to policy-making after 1878. In RT 4, the socio-economic dimension captures 
disagreements about the tariff law, workers’ accidence insurance, trade and industry 
regulations, and taxes. The regime dimension reflects mainly divisions about the adoption of 
the anti-socialist law and the military law. The regime dimension in RT 5 represents 
disagreements about matters like the renewal of the anti-socialist law, the abolition of the 
clergy expatriation law, and the official language of the state assembly of Alsace-Lorraine. 
The socio-economic dimension is dominated by disagreements about the tariff law, the 
domestic commerce regulation, the workers’ health insurance law, and the accidence 
insurance law. 
In the political conflict space of RT 6, the socio-economic dimension is again 
dominated by disagreements about the tariff law. It also captures different views about an 
amendment of an international trade treaty with Spain, as well as the establishment of a state 
spirits monopoly. Next to divisions on the clergy expatriation law, the extension of the anti-
socialist law, and the size of the military, the regime dimension also reflects disagreement 
about the country’s new colonial ambitions. Finally, disagreements about tariffs still factored 
into the socio-economic dimension of RT 7, but the dimension also reflects divergent views 
on domestic commerce and bank regulation. The regime dimension is formed by divisions 
about the size of the military, the length of the parliamentary term, the renewed extension of 
the anti-socialist law, and the publicity of Court proceedings. Statistically, the regime 
dimension was the dominant one again in RT 7, which might reflect the partly reactionary 
agenda of the Kartell coalition that dominated the Reichstag during that term. Somewhat 
inconsistently, the regime dimension also reflects disagreement about the old age and 
disability insurance bill. All previous votes on Bismarck’s social insurance bills were related 
to the socio-economic dimension. However, this is the only instance of a roll call vote clearly 
not conforming to the general pattern.  
After having seen how different subject matters relate to distinct dimensions in other 
legislative terms, we can also revisit the content of the dominant dimension in the NDRT. In 
contrast to the one-dimensional solution found for RT 2, which results mainly from the 
selective agenda voted upon during that term, the single dominant dimension of the NDRT 
included votes on both regime and socio-economic issues. Thus, legislators’ positions on 
these two issue bundles were tightly aligned in the NDRT, but diverged throughout all later 




This study examined political conflict dimensions in Imperial Germany during Chancellor 
Bismarck’s term of office. Based on an analysis of roll call votes taken in the Reichstag 
between 1867 and 1890, the dimensional scaling analysis suggests that throughout the period 
considered, two bundles of issues can be distinguished. The first bundle relates to socio-
economic issues, including the role of the federal state and the Church in governing society, 
the regulation of economic activities, tax and redistributive policies. The second bundle refers 
to regime matters, including the relative power and resources of parliament, civil rights and 
liberties, electoral provisions, and the organisation of justice. In the North German 
Confederation, political views of legislators along both issue bundles where largely aligned 
and thus collapsed into a single liberal-conservative dimension. However, the appearance of 
the Catholic Centre Party after the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 reshaped the 
political conflict space. In terms of social and economic issues, the Centre Party supported 
conservative solutions. Yet, in light of the minority status of Catholics in Germany and the 
repressive policies pursued against the Catholic Church during the so-called ‘Culture War’ in 
the early 1870s, it defended liberal positions with respect to civil rights and liberties as well 
as the powers of parliament. The emergence of the Centre Party, together with a move of 
parts of the National Liberals towards more conservative positions on regime issues, created a 
two-dimensional space that characterized political conflict throughout the remainder of the 
study period. Interestingly, these two issue bundles, socio-economic policies and regime 
matters, continued to play a major role in structuring political conflict in Germany, not only 
during the Wilhelmine era of the Kaiserreich (Smith and Turner 1981), but also in the 
Weimar Republic (Debus and Hansen 2010; Hansen and Debus 2012).  
Methodologically, the study illustrates the importance of taking changes in the agenda 
into account when using roll call votes to assess the dimensionality of a political conflict 
space. Based on purely statistical criteria for the selection of dimensions, we would have 
concluded that opinions on socio-economic issues did not divide legislators in the second 
legislative term of the Reichstag from 1874 to 1877. However, a closer look at the substance 
of legislation voted upon during that term revealed that this finding was a result of the very 
small number of votes taken on these types of issues. Opposing positions on socio-economic 
issues had not suddenly converged; they just had little opportunity to manifest themselves in 
parliamentary activities. In the second Reichstag term, these activities focused on issues 
related to the regime dimension. Especially in historical cases with comparatively modest 
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legislative productivity, changes in the legislative agenda can have undue effects on the 
results of a roll call analyses; their interpretation needs to be supported by information about 
the policy content of votes.  
The Centre Party’s electoral success in 1871 was based on the activation of a religious 
cleavage dividing the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority in Germany. At least in 
Prussia, Catholics were generally economically disadvantaged compared to Protestants. 
However, economic inequality did not play a primary role in the mobilisation of Catholic 
voters. Centre voters came from all economic strata (Nipperdey 2013: 344). Partly as a result 
of this economic diversity in the support base, especially the Centre Party’s early electoral 
announcements were vague on socio-economic issues, highlighting the defence of Church 
prerogatives and the federal nature of the Reich (Lepper 1998). The latter implied 
maintaining limits on the power of Protestant-dominated Prussia. In short, the Centre Party’s 
continuing electoral success was based on a genuinely religious divide that cut across 
economic sectors and social strata. However, its sudden appearance in 1870/71 also 
demonstrates that the political entrepreneurship of Catholic politicians and indeed the 
mobilization of Catholic voters by the clergy were instrumental for activating this cleavage 
(Anderson 1988: 134–136; Anderson 2000: 69–105). Once the Centre Party had been 
established as an important electoral and parliamentary force, it played a major role in 
perpetuating this division. 
Thus, in the case of Imperial Germany, an exclusive focus on the role of economic 
inequality as a factor influencing regime stability and change (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; 
Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix and Svolik 2013) misses an important part of the country’s 
political history. Before the emergence of the Centre Party, the actor and interest 
constellation in the German party system resembled quite closely the elite-competition 
interaction theorised by Ansell and Samuels (2014). An economically rising group, 
represented by the liberals, demanded more democratic participation and rights, possibly to 
protect their newly gained wealth from expropriation by the incumbent elite, represented by 
the government and the conservatives. However, the emergence of the Centre Party at the 
beginning of the 1870s does not fit this narrative.  
The Centre Party defended existing democratic achievements and promoted progressive 
reforms to defend the prerogatives of the Catholic Church and the Catholic ‘way of life’ 
against the Protestant-dominated governments of the Reich and Prussia. The fact that the 
Centre Party regularly supported the same socio-economic policies as the conservatives 
provides clear evidence that its regime preferences, which ran counter to those of 
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conservatives, cannot be reduced to economic considerations; and given its electoral strength 
and often pivotal position in the Reichstag, the Centre Party played a major role in 
determining the political development of Germany. In fact, when Bismarck decided to 
reverse course in the second half of the 1870s to pursue more protectionist economic policies 
that favoured agricultural landholders and large industrialists, the Centre Party provided the 
required support in the Reichstag when the National Liberals refused. Indeed, Bismarck’s 
ability to govern with varying majorities because of the Centre Party’s parliamentary strength 
and position in the political space may have bolstered the stability of the regime by avoiding 
legislative gridlock and a direct bipolar confrontation between the liberal and conservative 
camp. However, a more thorough investigation of this possibility is a topic for future 
research. As a more immediate conclusion, the study points to the need to delineate clearly 
the temporal and geographical scope conditions of theories of regime stability and change. 
When theoretical arguments presume a particular actor and interest constellation, it is 
difficult to see how they can provide adequate explanations for cases where these 
constellations were only partially present, only present during a particular period of time, or 
indeed not present at all. 
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Appendix 1  Additional tables and figure 
• Table A1: Share of Reichstag seats of party groups by legislative term  
• Table A2: Policy area of roll call vote by legislative term 
• Table A3: Type of subject matter of roll call vote by legislative term 
• Figure A1: Eigenvalue scree plots by legislative term 
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(German) Conservatives  69  54  21  40  59  50  77  79  449  
 0.23  0.14  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.13  0.19  0.20  0.15  
Free Conservatives  34  38  32  38  56  27  28  41  294  
 0.11  0.10  0.08  0.10  0.14  0.07  0.07  0.10  0.10  
French minority 15  15  15  15  15  15  90  
   0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03  
Guelphs  7  4  5  10  10  9  4  49  
  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.02  
Polish minority  11  13  14  14  14  18  16  13  113  
 0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.04  
Centre Party  60  91  92  94  99  101  98  635  
  0.16  0.23  0.23  0.24  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.21  
Federalist-Constitutionalist  18  18  
Association 0.06         0.01  
Liberal Centre Party  13  13  
 0.04         0.00  
Liberal Empire Party  30  30  
  0.08        0.01  
National Liberals  83  120  151  128  99  47  50  99  777  
 0.28  0.31  0.38  0.32  0.25  0.12  0.13  0.25  0.25  
Independents  18  13  10  9  12  6  5  5  78  
 0.06  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.03  
Free Association  15  15  
 0.05         0.00  
Liberal Association  46  46  
      0.12    0.02  
Progress Party / 30  44  49  41  26  59  65  32  346  
German Liberal Party 0.10  0.12  0.12  0.10  0.07  0.15  0.16  0.08  0.11  
German People's Party  1  1  3  3  8  7  0  23  
  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.01  
Socialist Workers’ Party 6  2  9  12  9  12  24  11  85  
 0.02  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.06  0.03  0.03  
Total members 297  382  397  397  397  397  397  397  3061  
 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Notes: Cells are shaded according to relative frequency. NDRT=Reichstag of North German Confederation, 
RT=Reichstag of German Empire. Socialist Workers’ Party refers to seats of the General German Workers’ 




Table A2 Policy area of roll call vote by legislative term 
Policy area NDRT  RT 1  RT 2  RT 3  RT 4  RT 5  RT 6  RT 7  Total  
Social Welfare  0  0  0  0  3  8  0  4  15  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.17  0.00  0.13  0.05  
Domestic Macroeconomic Issues  6  0  0  0  4  4  4  2  20  
0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.09  0.12  0.07  0.06  
Foreign Trade  1  2  1  1  18  4  21  5  53  
0.01  0.04  0.02  0.11  0.44  0.09  0.64  0.17  0.16  
Banking, Finance, and Domestic  8  2  0  1  4  15  0  8  38  
Commerce 0.10  0.04  0.00  0.11  0.10  0.32  0.00  0.27  0.11  
Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and  5  9  1  2  4  7  2  4  34  
Civil Liberties 0.06  0.19  0.02  0.22  0.10  0.15  0.06  0.13  0.10  
Defence  8  12  5  0  4  7  2  4  42  
0.10  0.25  0.12  0.00  0.10  0.15  0.06  0.13  0.13  
Law, Crime, and Family Issues  25  1  12  1  1  0  0  1  41  
0.31  0.02  0.29  0.11  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.12  
Government Operations  20  20  12  4  2  2  1  1  62  
0.25  0.42  0.29  0.44  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.19  
Other Issues  8  2  11  0  1  0  3  1  26  
0.10  0.04  0.26  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.09  0.03  0.08  
Total  81  48  42  9  41  47  33  30  331  
0.24  0.15  0.13  0.03  0.12  0.14  0.10  0.09   
Notes: Cells are shaded according to relative frequency. NDRT=Reichstag of North German Confederation, 
RT=Reichstag of German Empire. Policies classified according to the classification scheme of the Comparative 






Table A3 Type of subject matter of roll call vote by legislative term 
Type NDRT  RT 1  RT 2  RT 3  RT 4  RT 5  RT 6  RT 7  Total  
Legislation 54  30  33  9  35  38  28  29  256  
 0.67  0.62  0.79  1.00  0.85  0.81  0.85  0.97  0.77 
Constitutional 5  8  5  0  1  0  1  1  21  
amendment 0.06  0.17  0.12  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.06  
Budget  5  1  1  0  3  7  3  0  20  
 0.06  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.07  0.15  0.09  0.00  0.06  
Request to 8  5  1  0  0  0  0  0  14  
government 0.10  0.10  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  
Validity of  3  2  0  0  1  1  0  0  7  
mandate 0.04  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.02  
Parliamentary 2  1  2  0  0  1  0  0  6  
resolution 0.02  0.02  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.02  
International 2  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  4  
treaty 0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.01  
Address to 2  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  
Kaiser 0.02  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  
Total  81  48  42  9  41  47  33  30  331  
 0.24  0.15  0.13  0.03  0.12  0.14  0.10  0.09   
Of which: 
         
Procedural 2  5  2  0  1  5  5  2  22  
 0.02  0.10  0.05  0.00  0.02  0.11  0.15  0.07  0.07  
Final passage 2  2  5  2  6  2  4  7  30  
 0.02  0.04  0.12  0.22  0.15  0.04  0.12  0.23  0.09 
Notes: Cells are shaded according to relative frequency. NDRT=Reichstag of North German Confederation, 
RT=Reichstag of German Empire. 
Table A3 shows that the roll call data are dominated by votes on substantively important and 
legally consequential matters. Overall, almost 8 in 10 roll call votes (77 per cent) took place 
in the context of a legislative procedure, and another 6 per cent each referred to constitutional 
amendments and budget matters. The combined proportion of these three types of subject 
matters was somewhat lower during the NDRT and RT 1. The possibility that this difference 
is due to the lack of an alternative procedure to count votes when they were too close to call 
before the introduction of voting by division in 1874 cannot be ruled out. Still, even in these 
two terms, votes on the three types of subject matters dominated the roll call data (79 per cent 
in the NDRT, and 81 per cent in RT 1). In general, the overwhelming majority of roll call 
votes (93 per cent) has been called on substantive, not procedural matters. Finally, most roll 
call votes (91 per cent) are on specific parliamentary decisions or bill amendments rather than 
final passage votes of legislation. This is not a problem for scaling policy positions of 
legislators, as votes on amendments are more informative than final passage votes if the latter 




Figure A1 Eigenvalue scree plots by legislative terms 
Notes: Eigenvalues of the double-centred agreement score matrix. The number of dimensions before the ‘elbow’ 
in the number of eigenvalues indicates the dimensionality of the data. NDRT=Reichstag of North German 




Appendix 2 Detailed description of data sources, collection and coding 
 The source of the voting information is the overview of roll call votes in Appendix A of the 
‘General Register for the Stenographical Reports of all Reichstag Sessions from 1867 to 
1895’ (Reichstagsbureau 1896). After downloading the digitized version of the General 
Register from the website of the Bavarian State Library, optical character recognition (OCR) 
software was used to convert the PDF images of the roll call vote appendix into machine-
readable text.12 To identify the full population of legislators and disambiguate their party 
group affiliation and electoral district at the time of a particular vote, the vote data was linked 
to biographical information from the online database Biorab-Kaiserreich, which is hosted by 
the Centre for Historical Social Research at the GESIS Leibnitz Institute for the Social 
Sciences.13 Before combining the two datasets through a custom-made record linkage 
algorithm, information from both sources was extracted through computer scripts developed 
in Python. Several steps in the data collection process required extensive manual review and 
corrections based on the consultation of historical primary and secondary sources.  
The roll call vote appendix of the General Register consists of two parts, which were 
processed separately. The first part provides a chronologically numbered list of all roll call 
votes, distinguishing votes by successive legislative terms and sessions. Each entry includes a 
short description of the subject of the vote, when the vote was taken, and what the aggregate 
outcome of the vote was. Where appropriate, it also includes a reference to the official 
Reichstag document related to the vote. The second part provides an alphabetically numbered 
list of Reichstag members, indicating, for each roll call vote they took part in, whether they 
voted yeah, nay, or abstained. For each legislator, occupation, party group membership, and 
electoral district are also recorded. Several party group affiliations are indicated if a legislator 
changed his party group over time. The same is true for electoral districts. Unfortunately, no 
information is provided about the timing of these changes. 
Before further automated processing of the two lists, the results of the optical character 
recognition (OCR) conversion were reviewed and spelling, punctuation, and formatting errors 
                                                 
12
 For the download link, see http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/en_Band3_so_bsb00018728.html (last 
accessed 9 April 2016). Because most free optical character recognition software does not have the capability to 
recognize Fractur font, the commercial software ABBYY Recognition Server with Gothic/Fractur was used (see 
http://www.frakturschrift.com/en:products:recognition_server [last accessed 9 April 2016). 
13
 See the database description at http://zhsf.gesis.org/ParlamentarierPortal/biorabkr.htm. Biographical 
information about individual MdRs can be browsed at 
http://zhsf.gesis.org/ParlamentarierPortal/biorabkr_db/biorabkr_db.php (both last accessed 11 April 2016) 
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were corrected.14 Python computer scripts were then used to extract the relevant information 
from each of the lists and to reorganise it in the form of data matrices. From the list of roll 
call votes, the scripts extracted information about the legislative term and session number in 
which the vote took place, the number of yeah and nay votes, the name(s) of the sponsor(s) of 
the bill or amendment, whether the vote was about a committee text, the date of the vote, the 
reading in which the vote took place, the page numbers of the relevant session report, and the 
number of associated session report appendix documents. Furthermore, the script identified 
the type of issue under consideration, distinguishing between votes on laws (except 
constitutional amendments and budget laws), constitutional amendments, budget matters, 
requests to the Government (i.e. to the Bundesrat or Chancellor), the validity of mandates, 
parliamentary resolutions, international treaty ratifications, and addresses to the Kaiser. 
Again, the automated coding was manually checked and, if necessary, corrected. 
The extraction of the voting information from the second part of the Appendix of the 
General Register resulted in a dataset containing variables for the roll call number, vote 
choice, first and last name of legislator, party group affiliation(s), electoral district(s), and 
occupation. Once in machine-readable form, further consistency checks of the data were 
conducted to ensure the OCR results were error-free. In particular, for each individual 
Member of the Reichstag (MdR), it was confirmed that roll call numbers always appeared in 
sequence and that they did not include duplicates. Another check made sure that vote choices 
only included the possible options. Again, several corrections had to be made to the raw ORC 
results to pass these consistency checks. The General Register and its appendices are 
obviously based on the information in the official session reports. However, errors by the 
Reichstagsbuero in collecting and processing that information cannot be ruled out. It is also 
not clear whether the roll call vote appendix includes all MdRs, especially those that never 
took part in a vote.  
In order to identify the full population of MdRs over the 23 year period, to cross-
validate the attribution of votes to MdR names, and to differentiate multiple party group 
affiliations and electoral districts over time, the data were merged with biographical 
information about MdRs from the online database Biorab-Kaiserreich, which is hosted by the 
Centre for Historical Social Research at the GESIS Leibnitz Institute for the Social 
                                                 
14
 The OCR software provides a feature that is useful for efficiently reviewing the result of the conversion: 
Elements of the converted text with a particularly low probability of having been recognized correctly are 
highlighted. However, the feature is not error-free and cannot replace a careful reading of the converted text. 
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Sciences.15 To link the records in the voting data with the records in the bibliographical data, 
a simple matching algorithm was developed. Both datasets include variables for the surname 
of MDRs and their electoral districts. The algorithm loops through all legislative terms and 
every member of the Reichstag during each term. Whereas the biographical data identifies a 
singly electoral district for each MdR in a legislative term, the voting data only includes 
variables indicating which electoral districts an MdR represented sometime during the study 
period. Thus, in the first step, the algorithm attempts a fuzzy surname match of the MdR. If 
the electoral district of the matched MdR from the biographical data matches one of the 
electoral districts of the MdR in the voting data, the match is retained. If not, another fuzzy 
surname match is attempted, but this time the biographical data is limited to only those MdRs 
that were representing one of the electoral districts recorded for the MdR in the voting data. 
In most instances, this algorithm resulted in an unambiguous and correct match. The 
exceptions concern cases where several MdRs with the same surname were representing the 
same district during the same legislative term. Another reason for incorrect merges were 
compound names that occur as such in only one of the data sets. Since the fuzzy matching is 
based on string distances of surnames, some long compound names have larger string 
distances to one of their component names than to other, completely unrelated names. The 
linkage algorithm does not take account of that possibility. These cases were manually 
corrected after reviewing the merge results. 
Observations that were missing in one or the other of the datasets - and thus could not 
be merged - point to errors in one of them. Wherever such inconsistencies arose, third sources 
were consulted to identify which dataset contained the correct information.16 By matching the 
voting data with the biographical data, it was possible to add legislative term information for 
those MdRs in the voting data that never voted, and to add legislative term information for 
those that were members of several legislative terms, but only voted in some of them. MdRs 
that did not accept their mandate or whose mandate ended before the first legislative session 
of the term had started were dropped. Finally, it was possible to identify and correct ten errors 
in the attribution of votes to MdRs in the General Register, mainly caused by a confusion of 
identical surnames, and a couple of wrongly attributed electoral districts. 
                                                 
15
 Again, computer scripts were developed in Python to automatically download the HTML pages of the 
database, extract its information, and save it in a CSV file. See the database description at 
http://zhsf.gesis.org/ParlamentarierPortal/biorabkr.htm. Biographical information about individual MdRs can be 
browsed at http://zhsf.gesis.org/ParlamentarierPortal/biorabkr_db/biorabkr_db.php (both last accessed 11 April 
2016). 
16
 Particularly useful were the reference books of Reichstag election outcomes by Phillips (1883) and Specht 
and Schwabe (1904). 
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Like the electoral district information, membership in several party groups over time is 
only indicated as such in the voting data without a specification of when a party group switch 
occurred. Because the biographical data reports party group membership by legislative term, 
it was also useful in coding party group membership of individual MdRs over time. If the 
party group information in the two sources did not coincide, the party group information in 
contemporary Reichstag handbooks as well as reference books on Reichstag elections 
(Phillips 1883; Specht and Schwabe 1904) were consulted to identify the correct party group 
affiliation.17 The party group information in the handbook was also used to manually review 
the final party group coding of all MdRs. 
Unfortunately, the biographical data does not provide the exact dates of Reichstag 
membership for individual MdRs, but only the month of the year. In order to identify the 
population of MdRs eligible to take part in a particular roll call vote, the precise dates of their 
membership in the Reichstag is required. Starting with the rough periods provided by the 
biographical data, membership start dates before the precise start date of the first legislative 
session were replaced with the start date of the first legislative session. Similarly, 
membership end dates after the precise end date of the last legislative session were replaced 
with the end date of that session. For membership changes between those dates, Specht and 
Schwabe (1904), Phillips (1883), and Reichstag session protocols and appendices were 
consulted to identify the precise day of the membership change. 
  
                                                 
17
 The 16 volumes of Georg Hirth’s semi-official ‘Parlaments Almanach’, published between 1867 and 1887, 
can be accessed online (http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/en_rtbhzu.html, last accessed 12 April 2016). The 
Reichstagsbuero started publishing an official handbook only in 1890. 
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Appendix 3 Face-validity check: Intra-group divisions in the National Liberal Party 
As a further face validity check, Figure A2 replicates Figure 3 in the main text, but highlights 
the positions of members of the left wing of the National Liberal Party that seceded in 1880, 
formed the Liberal Association in 1881 (RT 5), and then formed a new party group with the 
left liberals from 1884 (RT 6 and RT 7). The positions of these left-wing National Liberals 
around Eduard Lasker, Ludwig Bamberger and Max von Forckenbeck are indicated by black 
Xs. In line with historical accounts, members of the Liberal Association in RT 5 took 
intermediate positions between the left liberal Progress Party and the National Liberals. With 
the possible exception of RT 1, ideal points of future secessionists are generally closer to the 
ideal points of left liberals than those of other National Liberals in earlier legislative terms as 
well. This consistent finding provides significant support for the face validity of the scaling 
results. Interestingly, once the secessionists had merged with the Progress Party, their voting 
behaviour in RT 6 and RT 7 became even more distinct from the National Liberals but 




Figure A2 Legislator ideal point estimates by legislative terms 
Notes: NDRT=Reichstag of North German Confederation, RT=Reichstag of German Empire, 1D=one-
dimensional solution, 2D=two-dimensional solution, rotated to fix centroid of German Conservatives to 
diagonal line in upper right quadrant. Z=Centre Party, K=German Conservatives, R=Free Conservatives, 
N=National Liberals, F=Left Liberals, S=Socialists, M=Minorities, W=Independents, B=Particularists (NDRT 
only), A=Liberal Centre (NDRT only), L=Liberal Empire Party (RT 1 only), X=National Liberals, who seceded 
from the party in 1880, formed the Liberal Association in RT 5, and formed a new party group with the left 




Phillips, A. (1883) Die Reichstags-Wahlen von 1867 bis 1883: Statistik der Wahlen zum 
Konstituierenden und Norddeutschen Reichstage, zum Zollparlament, sowie zu den fünf 
ersten Legislatur-Perioden des Deutschen Reichstages, Berlin: Louis Gerschel. 
Reichstagsbureau (1896) Generalregister zu den stenographischen Berichten über die 
Verhandlungen und den amtlichen Drucksachen des konstituirenden Reichstages, des 
Reichstages des Norddeutschen Bundes, des Deutschen Zollparlaments und des 
Deutschen Reichstages, Berlin: Norddeutsche Buchdruckerei und Verlags-Anstalt. 
Specht, F. and Schwabe, P. (1904) Die Reichstags-Wahlen von 1867 bis 1903: Eine Statistik 
der Reichstagswahlen nebst den Programmen der Parteien un einem Verzeichnisse der 
gewählten Abgeordneten, Berlin: Carl Heymanns. 
 
 
 
